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Since its inception, US. banking regulation has effectively prohibited a
bank from opening or owning a branch located outside of its home state,
commonly referred to as interstate branching. Only since the passage of the
Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act (IBBEA) of 1994
have banks been able to engage in interstate branching, albeit still subject to
significant state restrictions. Despite IBBEA 's removal of those barriers, it still
allowed the states to impose anticompetitive restrictions governing the entry of
out-of-state banks through the establishment of branch offices. As a result,
states that were opposed to entry used IBBEA to erect barriers to out-of-state
branch entry. This Article describes the changes in federal and state interstate
branching law since passage of IBBEA and reviews how initial (1994-1997)
and evolving (1998-2005) interstate branching laws affect out-of-state branch
growth in a state's banking market. We provide a detailed fifty-state plus the
District of Columbia survey of each state's initial interstate branch banking
restrictions and changes to those provisions between 1994 and 2005. Based
on the results of this survey, we employ regression analysis to determine
whether there was an empirical association between restrictive state regulation
and out-of-state branch banking entry. We conclude that anticompetitive state
provisions restricted out-of-state growth when those provisions were more
restrictive than the provisions set by neighboring states.
* Professor of Law, Loyola University Chicago School of Law.
** Ph.D., Financial Economist, Economic Research Department, Federal Reserve Bank
of Chicago.
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One aspect of the American banking system that quickly impresses itself on
the mind of a foreign observer is its fragmented structure.... [The]
prospective developments in the payments mechanism-electronic transfer
of funds, direct deposit of payrolls, and wider use of pre-authorized
credit-will reduce the need for customers to visit their banks frequently
and, though not resolving the branching controversy, will make it
academic.
I. Introduction
While much has changed in the last thirty-four years, bank branching has
not yet progressed from a controversial issue to a purely academic one.
Throughout its history, U.S. banking regulation has constrained bank growth
through prohibitions or restrictions on the means of direct and indirect bank
expansion both within states (intrastate banking and branching) and between
states (interstate banking and branching). 2 Although restrictions on intrastate
expansion were eliminated through piecemeal changes in legislation over the
past several decades, many restrictions remained regarding interstate expansion.
The passage of the Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching
Efficiency Act (IBBEA) of 19943 removed any remaining federal restrictions
on interstate expansion, but allowed the states considerable leeway in deciding
the rules governing entry by out-of-state branches.4 As a result, states opposing
entry used IBBEA to erect barriers to out-of-state branch entry.
1. Larry R. Mote, The Perennial Issue: Branch Banking, Bus. CONDITIONS (Federal
Reserve Bank of Chicago) Feb. 1974, at 3, 23.
2. The means of geographic expansion are: (1) interstate banking (acquiring or
establishing a charter in a state outside the main bank's home state), (2) interstate branching
(acquiring or establishing a branch office, an office which is not separately chartered or
capitalized, in a state outside the main bank's home state), (3) intrastate banking (acquiring or
establishing a charter within the main bank's home state), and (4) intrastate branching
(acquiring or establishing a branch office within the main bank's home state).
3. Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act of 1994 (IBBEA), Pub.
L. No. 103-328, 108 Stat. 2338 (1994) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.);
see also infra Part III (describing IBBEA interstate banking and branching provisions).
4. Passage of IBBEA ignited a small flurry of commentary about the Act. See generally
Ross M. ROBERTSON, THE COMPmTOuER AND BANK SUPERVISION: A HISTORICAL APPRAIsAL 28-
29 (Office of the Comptroller of the Currency 1995) (1968); Murray A. Indick & Satish M.
Kini, The Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act: New Options, New Problems, 112
BANKING L.J. 100 (1995); Patrick Mulloy & Cynthia Lasker, The Riegle-Neal Interstate
Banking and Branching Efficiency Act of 1994: Responding to Global Competition, 21 J.
LEGis. 255 (1995); Mark D. Rollinger, Interstate Banking and Branching Under the Riegle-
NealAct of 1994,33 HARv. J. ON LEGIS. 183 (1996); Charlotte L. Tart, Comment, Expansion of
the Banking Industry Under the Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act of
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IBBEA's removal of federal interstate branching barriers has resulted in
staggering interstate expansion. This growth, illustrated in Figure 1, was driven
both by consolidation of bank subsidiaries into branch offices and also
establishment of de novo branches. In 1994, 62 out-of-state branches existed in
a small number of states.5 By 2005, the number of out-of-state branches had
grown to 24,728.6
An examination of the impact of IBBEA and the effect of the state
restrictions and limitations that could be imposed on interstate branching is
particularly topical today. Banks recognize the state anticompetitive regulatory
burden permitted by IBBEA and have pressed agencies and Congress to
streamline banking law. A section in the Financial Services Regulatory Relief
Act7 (which was supported by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System) as passed by the House in 2006 would have eliminated remaining
interstate branching barriers. As described in testimony before the U.S. Senate
by Federal Reserve Governor Donald Kohn, the interstate branching provisions
originally contained in the Act would remove the "last obstacle to full interstate
branching for banks and level the playing field between banks and thrifts."
8
Although the final bill did not contain these provisions, the issue is sure to be
revisited in future bills and legislation.
Despite the recent growth in out-of-state branches, this Article provides
evidence that barriers to out-of-state entry through branch banking still exist for
1994: Is the Banking Industry Headed in the Right Direction?, 30 WAKE FoREST L. REv. 915
(1995); Stacey Stritzel, Note, The Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking andBranching EfficiencyAct
of 1994: Progress Toward A New Era in Financial Services Regulation, 46 SYRACUSE L. REV.
161 (1995).
5. The branch banking figures are based on authors' calculations using data from the
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) and the Federal Reserve System. Tara Rice &
Erin Davis, The Branch Banking Boom in Illinois: A Byproduct ofRestrictive Branching Laws,
238 Cin. FED. LETTER (Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, May 2007),
http://www.chicagofed.org/publications/fedletter/cflmay2007_238.pdf (last visited Feb. 17,
2008) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). This figure represents domestic
branches of domestic commercial-bank banking companies. See also infra Table 3 p. 105.
6. Infra Table 3 p. 105.
7. Compare H.R. 3505, 109th Cong. § 401 (2006) (having the title "Easing Restrictions
on Interstate Branching and Mergers" and removing remaining restrictions on de novo interstate
branching and prohibiting branching by subsidiaries of commercial firms chartered after
October 1, 2003), with S. 2856, 109th Cong. (2006) (containing no section comparable to
§ 401).
8. Consideration of Regulatory Relief Proposals: Hearing Before the S. Comm. of
Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 109th Cong. (2006) (statement of Donald L. Kohn,
Governor, Fed. Reserve Bd. of Governors), http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/
testimony/kohn20060301 a.htm (last visited Feb. 17, 2008) (on file with the Washington and
Lee Law Review).
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commercial banks in the United States. Based upon our empirical analysis,
covering all fifty states plus the District of Columbia over eleven years, we find
that certain state-imposed restrictions permitted by IBBEA are associated with
limited out-of-state branch growth in some states.
The remainder of the Article is organized as follows: Part II provides
historical background on the bank branching history in the United States. Part
III details the changes in interstate branching law since the passage of IBBEA.
Part IV discusses how initial (1994-1997) and evolving (1998-2005) state
interstate branching laws affect out-of-state branch growth in a state's banking
market. Part V presents our index of state branching restrictions, while Part VI
employs that index in empirical analysis on the effect of the individual state
branching restrictions.
II. Historical Background on Interstate Branching and IBBEA
Interstate branching has been an issue in the U.S. banking system since its
inception. The issue, however, did not become controversial until the
establishment of the dual banking system during the Civil War. These
restrictions on branch banking are frequently attributed to the efforts of small
banks and their lobbies to stop large banking companies from entering their
markets.9
Prior to the Civil War, interstate banking and branching was traditionally a
state issue, with federal law and policy typically deferring to state control.' 0
States historically have had control over whether to permit banks chartered
under their own chartering authority, state banks chartered by other states, and
national banking associations to engage in intrastate and interstate banking and
branching." With such control, states have prevented both intrastate and
9. For this study, we define "banking company" as an independent commercial bank, a
bank holding company (BHC), or a financial holding company (FHC) that controls one or more
commercial banks. A bank subsidiary of a BHC or FHC is a separately chartered institution
controlled through partial or complete ownership of its voting stock by a BHC or FHC, whereas
a branch office, a remote facility of a bank, requires no separate charter. Prior to the
establishment of BHCs, however, only independent banks existed. These retain the term
"bank." A branch office is an office of a financial institution that is physically separated from its
home office, but that offers the same kinds of deposit taking, loan, and other services conducted
at the home office. This study examines only domestic banking companies.
10. See PETER S. ROSE, BANKING ACROSS STATE LINES: PUBLIC AND PRIVATE
CONSEQUENCES 23-25 (1997) (ascribing management-related rationales to limited state
regulation of banks in the "state-dominated 'free banking' era" following the demise of the
Second Bank of the United States).
11. See id. at 23 (noting that banks were "generally allowed free reign in setting up,
moving or closing their branch offices," and describing the few existing regulations as designed
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interstate banking and branching up until the recent past. As restrictions
against interstate banking began to change on a piecemeal basis, Congress
removed the predominant interstate banking and branching restrictions with the
passage of IBBEA; however, this change was subject to a few important
limitations.12
With the exception of the Bank of the United States and the Second Bank
of the United States, chartered by Congress in 1791 and 1816 respectively,
3
the chartering and regulation of banks prior to the Civil War was almost
entirely a state issue. These two congressionally chartered banks were much
different from modem national banking associations and were chartered
essentially to assist the federal government with its banking needs and tax
collections. Both of these banks also had a number of branch offices, operating
eight and twenty-seven branches respectively.14 Both banks, however, had a
relatively short life, losing their Federal Charters in 1811 and 1836,
respectively. 5
State chartered banks engaged in limited interstate branch banking prior to
the Civil War. Although both the form of branch banking and the volume of
activities are quite different from today, branch banking did occur in several
regions. Limited decentralized interstate branch banking occurred in Indiana,
Ohio, and Iowa. 16 Although the different branches all shared the same charter,
each branch was "locally organized, had its own capital subscribed by its own
stockholders, and paid its own dividends.' 7 This model of branching was
adopted by state banks in Illinois, Kentucky, Tennessee, Delaware, and
Vermont. 18
During this same period, a more centralized system of branch banking
(similar to the modem system we have today) developed primarily in the south,
to prevent banking abuses).
12. See infra Part III (discussing IBBEA's specific federal level restrictions).
13. See Act of Feb. 25, 1791, ch. 10, 1 Stat. 191 (establishing the Bank of the United
States); Act of Apr. 10, 1816, ch. 44, 3 Stat. 266 (establishing the Second Bank of the United
States).
14. ROBERTSON, supra note 4, at 28.
15. For a discussion of the Bank of the United States and the Second Bank of the United
States, see JONATHAN R. MACEY ET AL., BANKING LAW & REGULATION 28 (3d ed. 2001);
ROBERTSON, supra note 4, at 28-29; ROSE, supra note 10, at 25.
16. ROBERTSON, supra note 4, at 28 (noting that the banks had a central board of directors
but each branch was "locally organized, had its own capital subscribed by its own stockholders,
and paid its own dividends, subject only to the... board's approval").
17. Id.
18. Id.
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with branch banking occurring in Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, and
Missouri.' 9 These branches, as opposed to those in the Midwest, relied much
more on capital raised in the head offices.20 This model was much closer in
substance to interstate banking than to intrastate branching.
The ability to engage in interstate branching and banking was never as
popular or considered to be as important prior to the Civil War as it is today.
Because of limited interstate travel and communication during this era,
maintaining interstate branches was difficult, if not impossible, with few of the
efficiencies and economies of scale possible today.21 With the advent of the
telegraph, telephone, and better interstate travel, the ability to engage in
interstate branching became more desirable. More recently, with advanced data
processing, telecommunications, and the internet, combined with growing
overhead costs, branch banking has become a necessity (and perhaps a question
of survival) for most large bank holding companies.
State control over banking became an issue during the Civil War as
Congress provided for the chartering and regulation of national banking
associations through the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC).
22
Investors chartered national banks, and they began to proliferate. There were
1,089 state banks and 467 national banks in 1864.3 By 1865, however, the
numbers had flipped; there were only 349 state banks and 1294 national
banks.2 4
Although the National Bank Act provided directives on the regulation,
supervision, and examination of national banks, it did not provide direction on
the issue of interstate and intrastate branching regulation.25 Because of the
19. See id. at 28-29 ("Branch systems of the kind in use today were not unknown, though
with one exception they were confined to the South."); MACEY ET AL., supra note 15, at 12 ("In
the South many banks operated branches in the modem sense, although the number of branches
was never very large.").
20. See ROBERTSON, supra note 4, at 28-29 (concluding that the capital structure of
branch banking in the South resulted because southern capital was "largely committed to the
plantation system and was not available for a unit bank in every community able to support
one").
21. See id. ("In a time of slow communication and transportation, it was impossible for a
head office to exercise day-to-day supervision over a network of branches.").
22. National Currency Act, ch. 58, 12 Stat. 665 (1863) (repealed 1864) (establishing the
office of the Comptroller of the Currency); National Bank Act, ch. 106, 13 Stat. 99 (1864)
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.) (same).
23. EUGENE NELSON WHITE, THE REGULATION AND REFORM OF THE AMERICAN BANKING
SYSTEM 12 (1983).
24. Id.
25. See ROBERTSON, supra note 4, at 81 ("Examination of the legislative history...
reveals no special concern about branches .... ").
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absence of statutory guidance, the Comptroller of the Currency provided
direction. In 1865, the Comptroller ruled that Sections 6 and 8 of the National
Banking Act prohibited branch banking.26 Based upon their reading of Section
6, every comptroller in office until 1922 agreed that national banks could not
open a bank in more than one location.
27
Likewise, during the next fifty years, there was little if any branching of
any kind occurring at the state level. The National Monetary Commission
noted, in a study commissioned in 1911, that "[u]nder none of the state banking
laws has there been built up an important system of branch banks. ',28 Most
state legislatures and regulators, however, resisted permitting interstate
branching. State banks often put pressure on regulators to limit entry by larger
banks chartered outside of the state that may have posed competitive
problems.29 Accordingly, few states permitted interstate branching. By 1900,
branch banking "accounted for only 2% of the resources of American
commercial banks.
30
By the turn of the century, branch banking began on a very small scale. In
the early 1900s, states began to permit some in-state branch banking.3 In
1911, California, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, New York, Rhode Island,
Virginia, and Washington permitted different degrees of intrastate branch
banking.32 By 1915, "397 banks maintained branches; of this group, 12 were
26. See id. at 82 (discussing the early interpretations of Sections 6 and 8); ROSE, supra
note 10, at 26-27 ("[T]he branching and service powers of federally chartered banks were left to
the Comptroller of the Currency and the courts to interpret.").
27. See Mote, supra note 1, at 6 ("Beginning with Freeman Clarke in 1865, every
Comptroller of the Currency up until D.R. Crissinger in 1922 interpreted the act in this
fashion."); ROSE, supra note 10, at 27 ("[E]very Comptroller of the Currency from Freeman
Clarke in 1865 to D.R. Crissinger in 1922 held that national banks could not operate from more
than one location.").
28. GEORGE E. BARNETr, STATE BANKS AND TRUST COMPANIES SINCE THE PASSAGE OF TE
NATIONAL-BANK ACT 135 (Gov't Printing Office 1911).
29. See WHITE, supra note 23, at 14 ("[T]he states were generally hostile to the
establishment of branch banking within their jurisdiction."); ROBERTSON, supra note 4, at 100
("In some states this legislation completely stopped an increase in multi-office banking .... ").
30. ROBERTSON, supra note 4, at 84.
31. See Rollinger, supra note 4, at 190 (observing that in the 191 Os and 1920s, some
states "began to enact statutes permitting state-chartered banks to bank in-state"); see also
MACEY ET AL., supra note 15, at 18 ("[A] few states... began to permit branching by state
banks."); Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., Too Big to Fail, Too Few to Serve? The Potential Risks of
Nationwide Banks, 77 IOWA L. REv. 957, 972 (1992) ("In the early 1900s, state banks
substantially expanded their number of branches in response to increased urbanization and the
rising demand among consumers for banking services.").
32. See BARNETT, supra note 28, at 136 ("The States in which state banks and trust
companies are definitely permitted to have branches are California, Delaware, Florida, Georgia,
New York, Oregon, Rhode Island, Virginia, and Washington.").
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national banks and 385 were state banks. The 397 institutions operated 785
branches; 832 offices were in the head-office city, and 350 were outside the
head-office city."
33
National banks continued to search for ways to get around the restrictions
against branch banking, particularly as it became more profitable to do so.
National banks also believed that they were at a substantial competitive
disadvantage in those situations in which state banks could branch. In 1922, in
an attempt to put national banks on a more equal footing with state banks, the
OCC, based upon an opinion from the Attorney General of the United States,
permitted national banks to establish branches only within their home city,
provided, however, that a state bank was permitted to operate branches within
that city.34 Between 1922 and 1926, national banks established 200 limited
service branch offices "within their city of location."35 State banks and their
supporters opposed national bank branching and challenged the Comptroller's
ruling. The opposition eventually came to a head in 1924, with the Supreme
Court ruling against the Comptroller.36
Although the Supreme Court ruled in favor of the state banking industry,
Congress responded in 1927 by permitting a national bank to branch with the
passage of the McFadden Act.37 The statute first provided that a national bank
could "retain and operate" any branches that it had as of the date of the
statute.38 Second, it stated that if a state bank were converted into, or
consolidated with, a national bank, it could retain and operate its branches.39
Third, a national bank could "establish and maintain" new branches within the
city in which it was located if state banks were permitted under the laws of its
33. ROBERTSON, supra note 4, at 100.
34. Id. at 102.
35. Id. at 104.
36. See First Nat'l Bank in St. Louis v. Missouri, 263 U.S. 640, 659 (1924), aff'g 249
S.W. 619 (Mo. 1923) (holding that the establishment of a bank branch is not an incidental
power vested in national banking associations); see also ROSE, supra note 10, at 28 (observing
that First National Bank in St. Louis upheld the interpretation that federal law outlawed national
bank branching).
37. See McFadden-Pepper Act, ch. 191, 44 Stat. 1224 (1927) (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.) (amending § 5155 of the Revised Statutes of the United States
and setting forth "conditions upon which a national banking association may retain or establish
and operate a branch or branches"); see also ROSE, supra note 10, at 28 ("This 1927 law
permitted national banks to set up branch offices in their home office cities provided state-
charted banks possessed similar branching powers.").
38. McFadden-Pepper Act, ch. 191, sec. 7, § 5155(a), 44 Stat. 1224,1228 (1927)(current
version at 12 U.S.C. § 36(a) (2000)).
39. Id. § 5155(b) (current version at 12 U.S.C. § 36(b) (2000)).
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state, subject to certain population limitations.4 0 Although couched in positive
statutory language, the effect of the McFadden Act was to limit branch
banking.41 By inference, branching outside of the city where the national bank
was situated was prohibited-thus restricting any intrastate or interstate
branching.
Congress gave national banks additional branching authorization six years
later. The Glass-Steagall Act of 1933 allowed nationally chartered banks to
branch in the same geographical areas as state-chartered banks.42 Although this
was intended to place national banks on an equal footing with state chartered
banks, it instead solidified the dominant position of state regulatory authorities
by assigning the determination of intrastate branching laws to each state
regulatory authority.43 National banks were permitted to branch wherever state-
chartered banks could branch statewide. However, national banks could not
branch if state banks had no or limited city or state wide branching rights.
44
Responding to pressure from state banks after the passage of the Glass-
Steagall Act, state regulation restricted intrastate branching in an attempt to
prevent entry and growth of national banks in their states.45 The McFadden Act
was read to stop interstate branching by national banks.46 After only a few
years, half of the states restricted or prohibited banks from setting up branch
offices.47 In addition, not one state permitted interstate branching.48 There was
some attempt to permit national banks to branch nationwide through federal
legislation. The bill, however, was defeated by the lobbying actions of
40. Id. § 5155(c)-(d) (current version at 12 U.S.C. § 36(c)-(d) (2000)).
41. See Wilmarth, supra note 31, at 973 ("The McFadden Act of 1927 thus provided very
limited gains for the pro-branching forces.").
42. Glass-Steagall Act, ch. 89, 48 Stat. 162 (1933) (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 36 (2000)).
43. See ROSE, supra note 10, at 31 ("Thus, if state-chartered banks were granted no
branching powers by their home states, national banks headquartered in those states could not
branch either.... Soon, more than half the states restricted or prohibited banks from setting up
branch offices.").
44. Id.
45. See Wilmarth, supra note 31, at 973-75 (discussing the intense opposition to the
Glass-Steagall Act).
46. See Rollinger, supra note 4, at 191-92 (stating that the states interpreted the
McFadden Act to prohibit national bank interstate branching by "negative implication").
47. ROSE, supra note 10, at 31.
48. See id. ("None noted to permit interstate expansion via establishment of full-service
branch offices."); Rollinger, supra note 4, at 191-92 ("Branching across state lines was not
allowed under any circumstance: no state authorized it for its state-chartered banks, and at the
federal level, the McFadden Act was construed as prohibiting.., interstate branching by
national banks.").
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community banks.49 In contrast to the growth of interstate banking described
below, prior to passage of IBBEA, the vast majority of states did not permit
interstate branching.
These regulatory constraints on interstate banking and branching spawned
the multi-bank holding company (MBHC), first formed in the early 1900s. °
The MBHC structure opened a loophole in branch-banking regulations that
allowed a layered organizational framework of subsidiary organizations to
substitute for a network of physical branch offices.5' Banks, therefore, used the
MBHC organizational form to effect interstate operations. Over time, additional
restrictions on interstate branching further encouraged use of the banking
company loophole as a means of geographic expansion, leading more banks to
convert to a banking company structure.5 2 The Bank Holding Company Act of
1956 sought to constrain the growth of the banking companies specifically
through the Douglas Amendment, 53 which prohibited acquisition by a banking
company of an out-of-state bank or banking company unless statutorily
authorized by the state in which the target resides.54 The Bank Holding
Company Act did not apply to one-bank bank holding companies (banking
companies), and it was amended in 1970 to give the Federal Reserve authority
over formation and regulation of the one-bank bank holding companies. 55 This
regulation was intended to further restrict the operations, organizational form,
and expansion ability of the bank holding companies.
Despite branch banking prohibitions by state law, federal law allowed
some minor opportunities for interstate branch banking. One such opportunity
for geographic bank expansion, through the BHC structure, was created with
49. See Rollinger, supra note 4, at 192 ("[A] bill to allow national banks to branch
statewide, regardless of state law, was defeated at the hands ofthe powerful community bankers'
lobby."); Wilmarth, supra note 31, at 973-75 (noting that the 1932 bill proposed by Senator
Glass that would have permitted limited interstate branching was opposed by community
banking advocates and defeated).
50. ROBERTSON, supra note 4, at 85 (discussing the origins of bank holding companies).
51. By definition, a subsidiary is a separately chartered institution controlled through
partial or complete ownership of its voting stock by a Multibank Holding Company (MBHC),
whereas a branch office, a remote facility of a bank, requires no separate charter.
52. ROBERTSON, supra note 4, at 100 (discussing the expansion of branch banking during
the first quarter of the twentieth century and observing that "anti-branching legislation led to the
expansion of [bank holding companies]").
53. Bank Holding Company Act of 1956, Pub. L. No. 84-511, § 3(d), 70 Stat. 133, 135
(1956) (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. 1842 (2000)).
54. Id.
55. Bank Holding Company Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-607, §§ 1, 101-105, 84 Stat.
1760, 1760, 1763, 1766 (1970) (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. §§ 1841-1850 (2000)).
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the 1982 Garn-St Germain Act.5 6 A provision of this Act authorized federal
banking agencies to arrange interstate acquisitions for failed banks with total
assets of $500 million or more.57 This policy innovation allowed interstate
acquisitions under special circumstances even when such acquisitions were not
in accordance with state law. Because federal savings and loan institutions had
been permitted to branch since 1933,58 banks welcomed the opportunity to
acquire failed savings and loan companies and their branch networks during the
savings and loan crisis.
A national bank could also create an interstate branch through "leap-
frogging" or moving their main office to a different state, leaving the former
location as a branch of the new home office. 59 The only limitation was that the
new office be located not more than thirty miles from the limits of the "city,
town or village" where the main office was previously located. 60 Although
such a method of branching was possible, it was limited to national banks
located near state borders.
Although interstate branching was severely restricted, over time individual
state laws permitted the geographic expansion of commercial banks through
interstate banking.6' Such laws had been relaxed prior to IBBEA for forty-nine
of the fifty states (plus the District of Columbia) for a variety of reasons:
Piecemeal changes in legislation, outside events, and competition among
regulators.62 All states except Hawaii permitted some type of interstate banking
56. Garn-St Germain Depository Institutions Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-320, 96 Stat.
1469 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.).
57. 12 U.S.C. § 1823(f)(4)(B) (2000 & Supp. V 2005).
5 8. HARDING DE C. WILLIAMS, FEDERAL BANKING LAW AND REGULATION: A HANDBOOK
FOR LAWYERs 102 (2006).
59. Id. at 102-03; Barton Crockett, BankAmerica to Merge Washington, Idaho Units
Using Thirty-Mile Rule, AM. BANKER, Aug. 23, 1995, at 7.
60. DEC. WILLIAMS, supranote 58, at 102-03 (citingActofMay 1, 1886, ch. 73,24 Stat.
18 (current version at 12 U.S.C. § 30 (2000))); see also Ramapo Bank v. Camp, 425 F.2d 333,
345 (3d Cir. 1970) ("[Tlhe bonafides of the relocation [of a national bank's main office] is
governed solely by the statutory provisions of Section 30 of the National Bank Act."), cert.
denied, 400 U.S. 828 (1970); OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER ON THE CURRENCY, CORPORATE
DECISION No. 96-40 ON THE APPLICATIONS OF SUN WORLD, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION, EL PASO,
TEXAS (Aug. 2, 1996), http://www.occ.treas.gov/interp/august/corpde40.pdf (last visited Feb.
17, 2008) (permitting the interstate relocation of the main office of a bank) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review); National BankAllowed to Relocate Main Office andRetain
Former Main Office as a Branch, 88 BANKING L.J. 704, 704-24 (1971) (discussing Ramapo
Bank).
61. For a discussion of interstate banking, see MACEY ET AL., supra note 15, at 26-27,32-
33; Douglas H. Ginsburg, Interstate Banking, 9 HOFSTRA L. REv. 1133 (1981).
62. Edward J. Kane, DeJure Interstate Banking: Why Only Now?, 28 J. MONEY, CREDIT
& BANKING 141, 143-46 (1996); Randall S. Kroszner & Philip E. Strahan, What Drives
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operations either on a reciprocal or nonreciprocal basis. 63 Regional pacts
allowed out-of-state bank entry only from a specific geographic region,
including the Northeast, the West, the South (often including the Mid-Atlantic
states), and the Midwest. 64
By 1994, while most states allowed interstate banking in some form, only
eight states allowed any form of interstate branching.6- Of those eight, six
allowed interstate branching only on a national reciprocal basis.66 Any state
that wished to allow its banks to branch into one of those six states must also
allow the banks headquartered in the six states to branch into their own state.
One state, Nevada, allowed interstate branching on a very limited but
nonreciprocal basis. It permitted interstate branching into counties with a
population less than 100,000.67 Utah was the only state that allowed national
nonreciprocal interstate branching before IBBEA, and it did so for just three
years (as of July 1991) before IBBEA was passed.68 Even though these rules
were on the books, there was almost no interstate branch banking prior to the
passage of IBBEA in 1995 .69 Thus, very few banking organizations had an
Deregulation? Economics and Politics of the Relaxation of Bank Branching Restrictions, 114
Q. J. ECON. 1437, 1437-67 (1999).
63. See H.R. REP. 103-448, at 21 (1994), reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2039, 2044
(stating that as of the report date only one state permitted no interstate banking); Jith Jayaratne
& Philip E. Strahan, Entry Restrictions, Industry Evolution, andDynamic Efficiency: Evidence
from Commercial Banking, 41 J.L. & ECON. 239, 243 (1998) ("By 1992... all states but Hawaii
had entered interstate banking agreements with other states.").
64. See Ne. Bancorp v. Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 472 U.S. 159, 177
(1985) (upholding regional pacts); H. Rodgin Cohen, State Interstate Banking Legislation, 597
PLI/CoRp 375, 379 (1988) (listing New England, the Southeast, the West, and the Midwest as
the broad categories of regions involved in regional pacts); Arnold G. Danielson, Tenth
Anniversary of Interstate Banking: The Southern Experience, 11 BANKING POL'Y REP. 4, 4
(1992) ("Most of the Southern states adopted a regional approach and excluded states north of
the Mason-Dixon line and most states west of the Mississippi River."); Interstate Banking's
Tenth Anniversary: The Midwest Experience, 11 BANKING POL'Y REP. 6, 6 (1992) ("Kentucky,
Michigan and Ohio... were primary forces in shifting the interstate movement from a regional
to a nationwide scope.").
65. See Dean Amel, State Laws Affecting Geographic Expansion of Commercial Banks 2,
19, 27, 32, 35-36, 40 (1993) (Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review) (identifying the states permitting
interstate branching as Alaska, Massachusetts, New York, Oregon, Rhode Island, Nevada, North
Carolina, and Utah).
66. See id. (identifying the states permitting interstate branching solely on a national
reciprocal basis as Alaska, Massachusetts, New York, Oregon, Rhode Island, and North
Carolina).
67. Infra Appendix A: Nevada p. 116.
68. See Financial Institutions Amendments, 1991 Utah Laws 476, 481 (enacting
nonreciprocal interstate branching legislation).
69. See generally Amel, supra note 65.
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opportunity to branch across state lines due to the preexisting legislation and
were restricted to expansion through only two means: (1) chartering a
subsidiary in the desired state (called a "de novo bank entry")70 or (2) acquiring
an out-of-state bank to convert to a subsidiary of the parent bank.71
This changed dramatically with passage ofTBBEA, which allows banks to
expand though its repeal of interstate banking and branching restrictions
(subject however to the permitted state restrictions discussed below). The
repeal of restrictions allows banking companies to merge either subsidiary or
branch banks across state lines in four ways:
(1) Interstate bank acquisitions (acquisitions of separately chartered
institutions);
(2) Interstate agency operations (allowing a bank subsidiary of a banking
company to act as an agent of an affiliate of the banking company without
being legally considered as a branch of that affiliate);
(3) Interstate branching (consolidation of acquired banks or individual
branches into branches of the acquiring bank); and
(4) De novo branching (establishment of a new branch office of a banking
company across state lines, into states which have passed a statute expressly
allowing it).
72
Thus, the watershed event of IBBEA was not the allowance of interstate
banking but the explicit permission of interstate branching. This gave banking
companies the freedom to consolidate bank subsidiaries into branch offices and
to branch, with minor restrictions, across state lines.
States could "opt in" early or "opt out" of the IBBEA interstate branching
provision by passing a state law any time between the passage of IBBEA
(September 1994) and the trigger date (June 1, 1997). Opting in required the
state to pass a statute allowing interstate branching prior to June 1997.74 This
provision expressly permitted interstate consolidation and merger transactions
prior to June 1, 1997, provided that each MBHC or subsidiary involved in the
70. A de novo bank is a newly chartered bank, as opposed to a bank that has been
acquired or merged from an existing institution.
71. Kane, supra note 62, at 143.
72. Id. at 148.
73. IBBEA, Pub. L. No. 103-328, § 102(a), 108 Stat. 2338, 2343-45 (codified at 12
U.S.C. § 1831u (2000)).
74. Id.
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transaction was located in a state that also opted in early.75 A state that opted
out of interstate branching prevented both the state and national banks from
branching across its borders.76 The provision, however, did not give banks
complete freedom to branch out of state. As discussed, from the time of
enactment until the branching "trigger date" of June 1, 1997, IBBEA allowed
states to determine many details related to this provision.
Although all fifty states and the District of Columbia have opted into
interstate branching, there was considerable debate and activity in many states
over whether their state should opt out of interstate branching.77 The pressure
to opt out of interstate branching under IBBEA was based on the small bank
versus big bank special interest issues that had thwarted interstate branching in
the past.78  Some argued that interstate branching might imperil smaller
communities by siphoning deposits out of the towns and using them to make
loans to larger clients in financial centers elsewhere.
79
States that debated opting out included Iowa, Texas, Colorado, Missouri,
Oklahoma, Montana, New Mexico, Nebraska, and Kansas,8 ° with Texas and
Montana opting out initially, though they later opted in.8 1  The Colorado
legislature also initially opted out, but the Governor later vetoed the
82legislation. 2 Lobbyists for smaller banks such as the Independent Bankers
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. See Kane, supra note 62, at 151 (providing a map of states engaged in the opt out
debate as of 1996).
78. Carter H. Golembe, History Offers Some Clues on Significance of Interstate
Branching, 13 BANKING POL'Y REP. 4, 4 (1994); Joseph D. Hutnyan, States Start Considering
Whether or When to Opt for Interstate Branching, 14 BANKING POL'Y REP. 7, 7 (1995).
79. See Barbara F. Bronstien, Focus on Kansas: Opt-out Pitch: Branching Imperils
Small Towns, AM. BANKER, Aug. 25, 1995, at 7 ("'Even in small communities such as ours that
are a little bit remote, we can really be hurt if we have a major branch of Bank of America and
they decide they need a whole bunch of deposits."' (quoting Larry Stutz, President of First
National Bank in Alma, Kansas)).
80. Terrence O'Hara, Circling the Wagons to Fend Off Branching, AM. BANKER, Feb. 15,
1995, at 6; see also Bronstien, supra note 79, at 7 (discussing the opt out debate in Kansas);
Barbara F. Bronstien, Q&A: Iowa Group's Departing President Says "No" to Interstate
Branching, AM. BANKER, July 21, 1995, at 7 (interviewing the President of Farmers and
Merchants Bank and Trust in Iowa on his belief that Iowa should opt out); Terrence O'Hara, A
Colorado Thumbs Down for Branching, AM. BANKER, Feb. 24, 1995, at 1 (describing
Colorado's initial decision to opt out); Terrence O'Hara, Setback Puts Oklahoma Foes of
Interstate on Defensive, AM. BANKER, Mar. 22, 1995, at 13 (discussing the fight in Oklahoma
against opt in legislation).
8 1. Capital Briefs: Montana Opts Out oflnterstate Branching Law, AM. BANKER, Apr. 8,
1997, at 4; Terrence O'Hara, Texas Governor to Sign Bill Letting State Opt Out of Branching
Law, AM. BANKER, Apr. 28, 1995, at 32.
82. Terrence O'Hara, Colorado Governor's Refusal to Slam Door to Out-of-State Banks
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Association of America, the California Independent Bankers and the
Independent Bankers Association of Texas all lobbied extensively to persuade
states to opt out of interstate banking.83 We discuss in greater detail below the
provisions determined by federal law and by the individual states.
Despite the restrictive anticompetitive provisions erected by some states,
the dramatic growth in the number of branches indicates that allowance of
interstate branching was welcomed by many states. This growth was driven
both by consolidation of bank subsidiaries into branch offices and also by
establishment of de novo branches. In 1994, only 62 out-of-state branches
existed in a small number of states. 84 By 2005, the number of out-of-state
branches had grown to 24,728 or 37.28% of all domestic branches. 85 The
number of de novo branches increased rapidly as well. Over our sample period,
6,071 de novo out-of-state branches were started; that is, of the 15,296 total
commercial bank branch increase between 1994 and 2005, almost 39.69% of
those were out-of-state de novo branches.86
III. IBBEA Interstate Banking and Branching Provisions Determined by
Federal Law
The fundamental regulatory paradigm for interstate banking and branching
changed dramatically with the passage of IBBEA. The statute is effectively
divided into two portions: Section 101 of IBBEA deals with interstate banking
while Sections 102 and 103 deal with interstate branching as summarized
below.
Leads to Compromise, AM. BANKER, Apr. 25, 1995, at 1.
83. See Hutnyan, supra note 78, at 7 ("[T]he Independent Bankers Association of
America (IBAA), which led opposition to nationwide branching in past years, is now providing
assistance to those banking groups trying to convince their state legislatures to opt out of
[interstate branching]."); Terrence O'Hara, An Arsenal of Opt Out: $250,000 ofAmmo from the
IBAA, AM. BANKER, Feb. 15, 1995, at 6 ("'We have taken a very strong position for the right of
states to pursue an opt-out strategy."' (quoting IBAA Lobbying Chief Ron Ence)); Christopher
Rhoads, Trade Group Wars: State Trade Groups Rocked as Dissenters Go Own Way, AM.
BANKER, Sept. 21, 1995, at 1 (stating that efforts by the California Independent Bankers to
block key elements of a California opt in bill have been successful and that battles between state
trade groups over interstate banking in Texas have strengthened the Independent Bankers
Association of Texas internally).
84. See infra Table 3 p. 105 (showing that there were 1.22 out-of-state branches per state
in 1994).
85. See id (showing that there were 484.86 out-of-state branches per state in 2005).
86. Id.
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A. IBBEA Provisions with Regard to Interstate Banking
IBBEA allowed interstate bank acquisitions after September 29, 1995,
repealed the Douglas Amendment of the 1956 Bank Holding Company Act,
and on June 1, 1997, permitted interstate branching.87 It expressly permits the
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (the Board) to approve
interstate bank acquisitions, regardless of whether such acquisitions would have
been permitted under "the law of any State.,88 Unlike the interstate branching
provisions discussed below, the states were not permitted to opt out of the
interstate banking rules.89
IBBEA does impose certain federal level restrictions on interstate banking.
First, the bank holding company acquiring the bank must be "adequately
capitalized" and "adequately managed." 90 Second, the bank holding company
after the acquisition may not exceed a nationwide deposit concentration
limitation of "10 percent of the total amount of deposits of insured depository
institutions in the United States."9' Third, the bank holding company may not
exceed a statewide deposit concentration limitation, after the acquisition, of
30%.92 IBBEA, however, did not affect the right of a state to impose a deposit
cap that would limit the amount of deposits below 30%.
93
In addition to preserving state deposit cap limitations, IBBEA also
preserved state age laws, subject to an important exception: An acquisition is
not permitted if it does not comply with a state's age law that limits acquisitions
of a bank "that has been in existence for the minimum period of time" provided
that the minimum age does not exceed five years.94 IBBEA also does not affect
the Board's right to take into account the applicability of a state's community
87. IBBEA, Pub. L. No. 103-328, §§ 101-03, 108 Stat. 2338, 2339-54 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.).
88. Id. § 101(a), 12 U.S.C. § 1842(d)(1)(A) (2000).
89. See id. § 101 (containing no provision for an opt out).
90. Id. § 101(a), 12 U.S.C. § 1842.
91. Id. § 101(a), 12 U.S.C. § 1842(d)(2)(A). The 10% limitation has already become
problematic for some bank holding companies. For example, Bank of America has already
reached that limit after its acquisition of FleetBoston. Effectively Bank of America will no
longer be able to grow through the acquisition of additional banks. Instead, Bank of America
will need to grow its deposit base internally. See Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
Board, Order Approving the Merger of Bank Holding Companies (Mar. 8, 2004),
http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/press/orders/2004/20040308/attachment.pdf (last
visited Feb. 17, 2008) (approving merger between Bank of America and FleetBoston) (on file
with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
92. IBBEA § 101(a), 12 U.S.C. § 1842(d)(2)(B).
93. Id., 12 U.S.C. § 1842(d)(2)(C).
94. Id., 12 U.S.C. § 1842(d)(1)(B).
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reinvestment laws95 or a state's antitrust laws. 96 In addition, IBBEA does not
affect a state's authority to tax the bank, the bank holding company, and any
affiliates of a bank.97 Even given these limitations, the overall effect of lBBEA
on interstate banking was to eliminate the last vestiges of state interstate
banking restrictions.
B. 1BBEA Provisions with Regard to Interstate Branching
IBBEA permits a national or state bank to engage in interstate branching,
subject to certain limitations. Essentially, a bank may engage in interstate
branching by (1) purchasing an out-of-state bank and converting that bank into
a branch or, (2) subject to state banking law, either purchasing the branch of an
out-of-state bank or opening a "de novo" branch in a state other than its home
state. 98 However, IBBEA did permit a state to opt out of interstate branching
and also to opt in early.99 Finally, IBBEA preserved a state's deposit cap and
minimum age laws with respect to interstate branching.' 00
Since June 1, 1997, IBBEA has permitted a merger between insured banks
with different home states, without regard to whether such transaction is
prohibited under the law of any state. 0 1 As part of the merger transaction, one
bank would essentially be converted into an out-of-state branch or branches of
the surviving bank. IBBEA also permits, subject to state law, a bank to acquire
an out-of-state branch and substantively merge it into the bank.0 2
Although IBBEA was intended to apply to all states, it did permit a state
to prohibit "expressly" all "merger transactions involving out-of-state banks," 03
effectively preventing interstate banking for that state. This was commonly
referred to as a bank's ability to "opt out" of interstate branching. The only
requirements were that (1) a state had to opt out of interstate branching after the
enactment date of IBBEA (September 29, 1994) and before June 1, 1997, and
(2) it had to apply "equally to all out-of-state banks.'' 4 Only Texas and
95. Id., 12 U.S.C. § 1842(d)(3).
96. Id., 12 U.S.C. § 1842(d)(4).
97. Id. § 101(b), 12 U.S.C. § 1846(b).
98. Id. § 102(a), 12 U.S.C. § 183 lu(a).
99. Id., 12 U.S.C. §§ 183 1u(a)(2)-(3).
100. Id., 12 U.S.C. § 183lu(b)(2)(C).
101. Id., 12 U.S.C. § 1831u(a)(1).
102. Id., 12 U.S.C. § 183 1u(a)(4).
103. Id., 12 U.S.C. § 1831u(a)(2).
104. Id., 12 U.S.C. § 1831u(b)(2).
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Montana elected to opt out of interstate branching, although both states later
opted back in. 105 IBBEA also permitted a state to "opt in" early to interstate
branching. An interstate merger transaction that resulted in out-of-state
branches could occur prior to June 1, 1997, provided that the state had enacted
a statute permitting such transaction.
0 6
IBBEA imposes several federal level limitations on interstate branching.
First, both banks must be adequately capitalized prior to the merger transaction,
and the resulting bank after the merger must also be "adequately capitalized"
and "adequately managed."'0 7 Second, the resulting bank after the merger may
not exceed a nationwide deposit concentration limitation of "more than 10% of
the total amount of deposits of insured depository institutions in the United
States. '" 8 Third, for other than initial entries, the resulting bank may not
control 30% or more of the deposits in either its home state or in any of its out-
of-state branches' host states, although a state is permitted to decrease or
increase that percentage as will be discussed below.'09
C. IBBEA Branching Provisions Determined by Individual States
While IBBEA opened the doors to nationwide branching, it allowed the
states to have considerable influence on the manner in which it was
implemented, permitting states to effectively impose anticompetitive obstacles
to interstate branching. It gave states the ability to set regulations on interstate
branching with regard to four important provisions: (1) the minimum age of
the target institution to be acquired and then merged into the acquirer, (2) de
novo interstate branching, (3) acquisition of individual branches, and
(4) statewide deposit cap. 0 IBBEA also does not limit a state's ability to
apply reciprocity conditions on those wanting to branch into the state. Over the
past decade, some states have been relaxing those restrictions.
105. Supra note 81 and accompanying text.
106. IBBEA § 102(a), 12 U.S.C. § 183lu(b)(3) (2000).
107. Id., 12 U.S.C. § 1831u(b)(4).
108. Id., 12 U.S.C. § 1831 u(b)(2)(A); see also supra notes 91-92 and accompanying text
(describing how the 10% limitation has already become problematic for some bank holding
companies).
109. IBBEA § 102(a), 12 U.S.C. § 183lu(b)(2)(B).
110. Id., 12 U.S.C. §§ 1831u(a)(5)-(6), (b)(2)(C).
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1. Minimum Age of Target Institution
Although IBBEA expressly permits interstate branching through interstate
bank mergers, IBBEA preserves state age laws with respect to such
acquisitions. Under IBBEA, states are allowed to set their own minimum age
requirements with respect to how long a bank has been in existence prior to its
acquisition in an interstate bank merger."' The state law, however, cannot
impose an age requirement of more than five years." l
2
This rule applies to all banks, whether they are chartered by a state
regulatory agency or the OCC. If a newly established subsidiary office is
located in a state which mandates a minimum age requirement, then the
banking company must wait to consolidate the subsidiary to a branch until the
subsidiary has met the necessary age requirement.
Many states set their age requirement at five years, but several states
implemented a lower state age requirement (three years) or required no
minimum age limit at all." 3 The age requirement of the subsidiary office
restricts entry of out-of-state banks that wish to establish branch offices or
slows consolidation for banking companies with newly established subsidiaries
located in states with such requirements.
An age requirement serves two important functions for a state banking
industry. First, it protects older and established banks in the state. To branch
into a state with an age requirement, the only mode of entry is to buy an older
institution and merge it into the bank. Second, it imposes significant costs on
out-of-state entry. Rather than simply opening a de novo branch office, a bank
is required to purchase an entire operating bank to enter a state. Separate bank
charters are presumably more costly than a branch office because they require
separate charters, management, capital, and boards of directors.
2. De Novo Interstate Branching
While interstate branching done through an interstate bank merger (i.e. the
purchase and conversion of an existing bank to a branch office) is now
permitted in every state, de novo interstate branching is only permitted under
IBBEA if a state explicitly "opts in" to this provision; that is, a bank is allowed
to open an interstate branch only if state law expressly permits it to do so.'
111. Id., 12 U.S.C. § 1831u(a)(5)(A).
112. Id., 12 U.S.C. § 1231u(a)(5)(B).
113. Infra Appendix A pp. 107-27.
114. See IBBEA § 103, 12 U.S.C. § 36(g) (2000) (permitting de novo interstate branching
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This provision applies only to initial entry, though this is not stated in
many of the statutes. This implies that, if a bank is able to enter a state through
a loophole and establish one initial out-of-state branch, it may then open other
branches in that state. We discuss this important distinction and its
implications below.
De novo branching allows a bank to branch interstate without the costs of
purchasing an operating bank, discussed above. A de novo branching rule
benefits all banking companies wishing to enter a state; but small banking
companies may benefit more than large banking companies because they may
be less able to acquire an existing bank than to open a branch office.
3. Acquisition of Single Branches or Other Portions of an Institution
IBBEA states that an interstate merger transaction may involve the
acquisition of a branch (or a number of branches) of a bank without the
acquisition of the entire bank itself only if the state in which the branch is
located permits such a purchase.l"5 Again, states must explicitly "opt in" to this
provision. In enacting such a provision, many states also subject a branch
acquisition to an age requirement.
Such a provision makes it less costly and more efficient for a bank to
engage in interstate branching. Rather than being required to enter into an
interstate merger of an entire bank in order to interstate branch, a bank may
now choose those interstate branches that it wishes to acquire. For example, an
Indiana bank wanting to interstate branch into Illinois may only want to acquire
the Chicago branches of an Illinois bank, as opposed to acquiring the Peoria
branches as well.
4. Statewide Deposit Cap
Under IBBEA, an interstate merger-other than with respect to initial
entry-will not be approved if the resulting bank, including any affiliated
insured depository institutions, controlled 30% or more of the insured deposits
in the state. 16 This limitation, however, is not to be construed to affect a state's
authority to limit the percentage of deposits that may be controlled by a bank or
for national banks and state banks granted membership pursuant to 12 U.S.C. §§ 321, 1828(d)
(2000)).
115. Id. § 102(a), 12U.S.C. § 1831u(a)(2).
116. Id., 12 U.S.C. § 1831u.
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holding company.' 7 IBBEA preserves the right of a state to impose a deposit
cap on an interstate bank merger transaction below 30% and also to impose
limitations with respect to initial entry.' 8 The provision should also be read to
preserve a state's right to permit deposit concentration levels to exceed 30%.
The obvious impact of a deposit concentration limitation would be to
prevent a bank from entering into a larger interstate merger in such a state. For
example, if a state had set a deposit cap of 15%, a bank could not enter into an
interstate merger transaction with any institution that held more than 15% of the
deposits in that particular state. A state could also try to encourage interstate
mergers by permitting concentration levels to exceed 30% in order to attract an
out-of-state acquirer.
5. Reciprocity
Rather than specifically permitting or prohibiting de novo branching,
acquisition of a branch or portion of a bank, a set age requirement, or deposit
cap, many states chose to offer these four provisions with reciprocity. In other
words, the state would allow the particular action by an out-of-state bank so
long as the laws of the state for that out-of-state bank were reciprocal,
permitting the same level of interstate branching. For example, a state could
permit de novo entry into its state, provided that the state in which the out-of-
state bank is chartered (or headquartered in the case of a national bank) also
permitted de novo entry into their state.
IV. States' Responses to Interstate Branching Provisions
To collect information on each state's initial IBBEA provisions and
changes to those provisions between 1994 and 2005, we surveyed individual
state statutes over the eleven-year period. 119 We collected all state statutes that
address interstate branching, interpreting the provisions and changes to those
117. Id. § 102, 12U.S.C. § 1831u(b)(2)(C).
118. Id. § 102(a), 12 U.S.C. § 183lu(b)(2)(D).
119. The Conference of State Bank Supervisors (CSBS) publishes a respected Profile of
State-Chartered Banking every two years. Although the information included on interstate
branching is useful, it is collected through voluntary surveys to the individual states. The state
responses are not uniform and thus could not be used in our empirical analysis, which covers,
annually, the fifty states plus the District of Columbia over the eleven-year period studied. See
generally CONFERENCE OF STATE BANK SUPERVISORS, A PROFILE OF STATE-CHARTERED BANKING
(19th ed. 2002).
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provisions over the eleven-year period. 20 We discuss the states' regulatory
actions for each provision below.
Table 1 details the changes to state interstate branching law. Since the
1997 "trigger date," thirteen states have eased their initial restrictions on
interstate branching. Those states are Georgia, Hawaii, Illinois, Kentucky,
Montana, New Hampshire, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Tennessee, Texas, Utah,
Washington, and Vermont. Table 2 lists for 1997 and 2005 the number of
states that allowed or prohibited each of the four state-determined provisions.
This table shows, generally, that states eased their interstate branching
restrictions over time. Appendix A lists each of the states' interstate branching
laws from 1994-2005.
A. Minimum Age of Target Institution
As of the 1997 trigger date, thirty states had a five-year minimum age
requirement.'12 Five had a three-year age requirement, thirteen plus the District
of Columbia had no age requirement, two of which with an added reciprocal
condition, and two states (Montana and Texas) opted out. By year end 2005,
twenty-five states had a five-year minimum age requirement, seven had a three-
year minimum age requirement, eighteen states and the District of Columbia
had no age requirement, five of which with reciprocity requirements. Most of
the states that changed their statutes over the time period generally moved from
a five-year requirement to no age requirement. One state, Indiana, added a
minimum age requirement. In 1997, it had no age requirement, but added a
five-year age requirement in 1998.
B. Statewide Deposit Cap on Branch Acquisition
In 1997, thirty-two states plus the District of Columbia imposed a 30%
statewide deposit cap, the standard set by IBBEA. Some states enacted
legislation that explicitly enacted a state-wide deposit cap of 30%, while some
states were silent on the deposit cap, in which case, the IBBEA state-wide cap
applies. Fourteen states imposed a statewide deposit cap less than 30%, which
is more restrictive than IBBEA dictates. Two states chose statewide deposit
120. We also contacted the individual state regulatory agencies when we found
discrepancies, ambiguities, or omissions in the state statutes.
121. Oregon's law (passed prior to the trigger date) was effective July 1, 1997. One state,
Arizona, had a five-year minimum age requirement with reciprocity.
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caps greater than 30%, and two states expressly imposed no deposit cap. Only
three states made changes to their statewide deposit caps over time; 122 all
increased the cap.
C. De Novo Interstate Branching
As of 1997, twelve states and the District of Columbia allowed de novo
branching. Of those, eight states allowed it with reciprocity, thirty-six states
prohibited de novo branching, and two (Montana and Texas) opted-out. By
year's end 2005, twenty-two states plus the District of Columbia allowed de
novo branching, sixteen of those twenty-two states allowed it with reciprocity,
and twenty-eight states prohibited de novo branching. States that made
changes moved from prohibiting de novo branching to either allowing it
unrestricted or with reciprocity. All states that made changes over the time
period eased restrictions.
D. Acquisition of Single Branches or Other Portions of an Institution
In 1997, thirty-one states prohibited acquisition of a branch or a portion of
a bank. Eighteen states allowed it: Ten states plus the District of Columbia
allowed it unrestricted, and seven states allowed it with reciprocity. Again,
Montana and Texas opted out. By year's end 2005, twenty-four states, seven
fewer than in 1997, prohibited acquisition of branches or a portion of a bank.
Twenty-seven allowed it, with thirteen unrestricted and fourteen with
reciprocity. All states that changed restrictions over time eased those
restrictions.
E. Reciprocity
By the end of 2005, sixteen states allowed de novo branching with
reciprocity. This means that an out-of-state bank could enter into one of those
sixteen states through de novo branching as long as their home state also
allowed it. Over time, the number of states permitting de novo branching or
acquisition of a branch or portion of a bank with reciprocity increased.
122. See Appendix A (showing that Montana, New Hampshire, and Oklahoma increased
the deposit cap).
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V. Description of State Branching-Restriction Index
Using our information on state branching statutes, we create quantitative
measures to assess the relative restrictiveness of the state interstate branching
law post-IBBEA. We do this in two ways. First, we assign a value of one for
each factor to the states that set more restrictive provisions than those set by
IBBEA for each of the provisions discussed above (minimum age for
acquisition, de novo interstate branching, interstate branching by acquisition of
a single branch or other portions of an institution, and statewide deposit cap).
Specifically, we define the state restriction variables as follows: Deposit Cap
equals one if a state enacted deposit cap of 30% or less; otherwise, Deposit Cap
equals zero. Minimum Age equals one if a state enacted a three- or five-year
minimum age for acquisition requirement; otherwise, it equals zero. De Novo
Branching equals one if a state prohibits it; otherwise it equals zero. Single
Branch Acquisition equals one if a state prohibits it; otherwise it equals zero.
Finally, Reciprocity equals one if the state instituted a reciprocity condition;
otherwise, it equals zero.
We next create an index to proxy for a restrictive interstate branching
regulatory environment. We aggregate the four factors to give a value for the index
between zero and four with zero being the least restrictive and four being the most
restrictive. Thus, our index is equally weighted between the four factors. Because
we have collected the information on state statutes and changes to those statutes
since 1994, we have an index that changes over time.
V. Data and Analysis
A. Data
Our data set consists of all banking companies that existed from 1994 (the year
in which IBBEA was enacted) through 2005. For each banking company, we also
include its subsidiary bank and branch data. The parent bank holding company
consolidated financial data are collected from the Federal Reserve Board's FR Y-9C
reports. The bank-specific financial data are taken from the Federal Financial
Institutions Examination Council's Consolidated Reports of Condition and Income
(call reports). The branch data come from the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation's Summary of Deposits data.
The three data sets are merged by the top-tier entity (be it a bank or bank
holding company), with one observation for each bank and branch office owned by
that top-tier entity. This aggregated branch/bank/bank holding company data set has
over 900,000 observations. We aggregate the banking company information for
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each state and construct a panel set where each state plus the District of Columbia
(denoted s = 1,..., 51) has one observation per year (denoted t = 1,... , 7) for the
entire sample period. The resulting time-series, cross-sectional sample has s * T, or
612 observations. Finally, to this set, we add the state interstate branching variables
representing each of the four state provisions, the reciprocity condition, and the state
restriction index.
B. Empirical Analysis
Table 3 contains the summary statistics of our variables for the years 1994,
1997, 2000, and 2005. The table shows that the restriction index has declined over
time. This decline is consistent with Table 2, which shows that, over time, the state
laws became, on average, less restrictive. The increasing number of out-of-state
branch offices and the proportion of out-of-state branches to total branches is
consistent with our hypothesis that, as state regulations became less restrictive, more
out-of-state branches would emerge.
The table suggests that the restrictiveness of state interstate branching law (post
IBBEA) may be associated with growth of out-of-state branches. To empirically
test this hypothesis, whether state-specific interstate branching laws affect the
growth of out-of-state branches, we model out-of-state branches at the state level as
a function of state restrictions, which limit competition from out-of-state banks, and
a number of controls.
The general form of the model is:
Out-of-state branches,, = a, + y, + #I *state restrictionss, +f82 * reciprocityst + est,
where the dependent variable, out-ofstate branches, is the number of out-of-state
branches to total branches, the intercept a captures the state fixed effects, the
intercept y denotes the year-specific fixed effects, state restrictions is, alternatively,
each of the state branching variables or our interstate branching index, and
reciprocity is an indicator variable for whether the states imposed a reciprocity
condition. 123 We include reciprocity because this condition, imposed by some states
for some provisions, directly affects whether the provision itself applies uniformly to
all out-of-state banks wishing to establish branch offices in a particular state. A state
could allow acquisition of single branches, for example, but only with reciprocity.
Banks from states that also had reciprocity or allowed acquisition of single branches
123. This regression model is used to evaluate the linear relationship between the out-of-
state branch growth (the dependent variable) and the individual state restriction variables (the
explanatory variables), the regression coefficients are represented by a and y (the intercepts) and
fl, and f 2.
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outright would be therefore allowed to branch into the state that allows single
branch acquisition with reciprocity. On the other hand, banks from states that
prohibited single branch acquisition would not be allowed to branch into the state
that allowed it with reciprocity.
Table 4 contains the regression results for our panel of fifty states plus the
District of Columbia. Our results show that the state provisions granted by LBBEA
affected out-of-state branch growth. That is, states with looser restrictions on
interstate branching experienced greater growth in out-of-state branches than states
with tighter restrictions. Our model is estimated using ordinary least squares (OLS)
techniques with state and time fixed effects. Fixed effects estimation is a commonly
accepted method in the economics ofestimating parameters from a panel data set.
124
This method is used when the averages of the dependent variable are expected to be
different for each cross-section unit (in our case, by state) and/or each time period
(in our case, by year), but the variance of the errors are not expected to be different.
The superscripts *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5%,
and 1% levels, respectively. Statistical significance indicates that the probability of
obtaining the association between the dependent and independent variables by
chance is low. A 1% level means that there is a 99% chance that the obtained result
is true and a 1% chance that the result occurred randomly. The regression R-
squared statistics are included in the last row. The R-squared statistic is a commonly
accepted indicator of the reliability of a relationship identified by regression and
ranges between 0 and 1. The R-squared statistics for the five altemative regression
specifications, listed in Table 4, range between 0.290 and 0.318; meaning we can
explain a sizable 29% to 32% of the variation in the proportion of out-of-state
branches to total branches in states by the state interstate branching restriction
variables and the reciprocity variable, controlling for state and time fixed effects.
Each of the columns 1-4 includes a single interstate branching provision, time,
and state fixed effects, a constant term, and the reciprocity indicator variable.
Column 5 contains regression results using the restriction index, the sum of the four
provisions, time and state fixed effects, a constant term, and the reciprocity indicator
variable.
If higher interstate branching restrictions were associated with fewer out-of-
state branches then we would expect the coefficients (the B estimates of the
dependent variables) to be negative and statistically significant. Our results indicate
that two of the four provisions are statistically significant (acquisition of single
124. See WILLIAM H. GREENE, ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS 559-60 (4th ed. 2000) ("The
fundamental advantage of a panel data set over a cross section is that it will allow the researcher
far greater flexibility in modeling differences in behavior across individuals.... A common
formulation of the model assumes that differences across units can be captured in differences in
the constant term.").
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branches at the 5% level and the statewide deposit cap at the 1% level); suggesting
that these two provisions, specifically, adversely affect out-of-state branch growth in
states by prohibiting acquisition of single branches and by having a lower statewide
deposit cap. The estimated coefficients for de novo branching and the minimum
age requirement are not statistically significant, which suggests that these two
restrictions are not binding constraints; that is, that banking companies were either
(a) able to circumvent the minimum age requirement and prohibition on de novo
branching or (b) the other restrictions were more binding than these two restrictions.
The coefficient on the restriction index is negative and statistically significant at the
1% level, suggesting that, as a whole, the four provisions engendered by IBBEA
resulted in fewer out-of-state branches in states with higher restrictions, overall. The
coefficient on reciprocity is not significant, suggesting that this condition did not
affect out-of-state branch growth at all. If states imposed this condition to restrict
entry, then importantly, this finding thus implies that imposing a. reciprocity
condition serves no clear purpose.
VII. Conclusion
While IBBEA, passed in 1994 and effective in 1995, opened the doors to
nationwide branching, it allowed the individual states to have considerable influence
in the manner in which it was implemented. Many states used the provisions to
erect barriers to out-of-state entry. Over the past decade, states have been relaxing
those restrictions. Since 1997, thirteen states have eased their initial restrictions on
interstate branching. 1
25
We conclude that two of the four provisions (the state-wide deposit cap and
prohibition on the acquisition of single branches) granted to the states by IBBEA
restricted out-of-state branch growth when those provisions were more restrictive
than the provisions set by either IBBEA or neighboring states. We find that the
minimum age requirement and de novo interstate branching did not materially affect
out-of-state branch growth. It is likely that banks were simply able to circumvent
these restrictions or that the other two provisions were more restrictive, or
constraining, to out-of-state branch growth. Our results suggest that the elimination
of remaining interstate branching restrictions would likely result in increased out-of-
state branch growth by lowering the barriers (or costs) for out-of-state banks to enter
new banking markets.
125. See infra Table 1 pp. 102-03 (describing the statutory changes made in Georgia,
Hawaii, Illinois, Kentucky, Montana, New Hampshire, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Tennessee,
Texas, Utah, Vermont, and Washington).
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VIII. Appendix
Figure 1
Number of Banks, Bank Holding Companies, and Branches
in the United States: 1994-2005
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Table 1
States That Revised Interstate Branching Provisions Between 1997 and 2005
State Post-Enactment Changes Effective Date
No effective changes in statute. Though it was
enacted 9/1/1996, not until 8/31/2001 could an
Arizona out-of-state bank acquire a single branch (with a 8/31/2001
minimum five-year age requirement). Added
reciprocity condition for minimum age
requirement and branch acquisition.
Georgia Reduced minimum age requirement from five to 5/10/2002three years.
Allowed de novo branching, branch
Hawaii acquisition and eliminated minimum age 1/1/2001
requirement.
Allowed de novo branching, branch
acquisition, and eliminated minimum age
Illinois requirement. Added reciprocity condition for 8/20/2004
minimum age requirement, de novo
branching, and branch acquisition.
Indiana Added minimum age requirement. 7/1/1998
Kentucky Added reciprocity condition for minimum age 3/22/2004
requirement.
Opted in. Allowed branch acquisition with
Montana five-year minimum age requirement, 10/1/2001
increased state deposit cap by 1% annually to
a maximum of 22%.
NewH e Eliminated minimum age requirement. 1/1/2002Hampshire
New Allowed de novo branching, branch
acquisition, and changed state deposit cap 8/1/2000
Hampshire from 20% to 30%.
Three statutes enacted between 1995 and
1999, but the last two contained no effective
change. The original act (1995) permitted de
novo branching and branch acquisition with
North reciprocity until 1997. In 1997, North
Carolina Carolina extended the reciprocity condition
until 1999. In 1999, North Carolina made the
reciprocity condition permanent by
eliminating the clause that had reciprocity
expire on 6/1/1999.
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North Allowed de novo branching and branchot acquisition. Added reciprocity condition for 8//2003
de novo branching and branch acquisition.
Allowed de novo branching, branch
Oklahoma acquisition, eliminated minimum age 5/17/2000
requirement, and increased state deposit cap
from 15% to 20% in 2000.
Tennessee Reduced minimum age requirement from five 3/17/2003to three years in 2003.
Tennessee Allowed de novo branching. Added
Tennessee__ reciprocity condition for de novo branching. 7/1/2001
Tennessee Allowed branch acquisition. Added 5/1/1998
reciprocity condition for branch acquisition.
Allowed de novo branching and branch
acquisition. Added reciprocity condition for
Texas de novo branching and branch acquisition. 9/1/1999
No minimum age requirement for states with
reciprocity, five-year minimum age
requirement for states with no reciprocity.
Utah Allowed de novo branching. Added 4/30/2001
reciprocity condition.
Eliminated minimum age requirement,
Vermont allowed de novo branching. Added 1/1/2001
reciprocity condition for de novo branching.
Allowed de novo branching and branch
Washington acquisition. Added reciprocity condition for 5/9/2005
de novo branching and branch acquisition.
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Table 2
Number of States That Allowed or Prohibited Each of the State-
Determined Provisions: 1997 and 2005




1997 12 31 6 2
2005 14 24 13 0




1997 5 36 8 2
2005 7 28 16 0





1997 30 5 11 3 2
2005 24 7 14 6 0
30% <30% >30% None N/A*
Statewide
Deposit Cap
1997 34 13 2 2 2
2005 35 14 2 2 0
* Montana and Texas originally opted out of IBBEA
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Table 3
Summary Statistics
The state restriction variables are defined as follows: Deposit Cap equals one if
state enacted deposit cap of 30% or less; otherwise Deposit Cap equals zero.
Minimum Age equals one if a state enacted three- or five-year minimum age for
acquisition requirement; otherwise, it equals zero. De Novo Branching equals
one if a state prohibits it; otherwise, it equals zero. Single Branch Acquisition
equals one if a state prohibits it, else zero. Finally, Reciprocity equals one if
the state instituted a reciprocity condition, else zero.
1994 1997 2000 2005
Mean (Std. Dev)
Number of Out-
of-State 1.22 161.20 323.47 484.86
Branches Per (5.85) (249.96) (421.74) (561.16)
State
Proportion of
Out-of-State 0.0074 0.1849 0.2603 0.3728
Branches to (0.0373) (0.2208) (0.2277) (0.2101)
Total Branches
Restriction 2.491 2.314 1.941
Index (1.461) (1.378) (1.489)
Minimum Age N/A 0.745 0.706 0.627
Dummy (0.440) (0.460) (0.488)
De Novo 0.745 0.706 0.549
Branching N/A (0.440) (0.460) (0.503)
Dummy
Acquisition of 0.647 0.588 0.471
Single Branches N/A (0.482) (0.497) (0.504)
Dummy
Deposit Cap N/A 0.353 0.314 0.294
Dummy (0.483) (0.469) (0.460)
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Table 4
Regression Results
Regression results for balance panel (N= 612) of fifty states plus the District of
Columbia, aggregated from bank/branch level data, 1994-2005. The dependent
variable equals the number of out-of-state branches to total branches. All
variables are based on annual observations from year t. Equations are estimated
with fixed time and state effects. The superscripts *, **, and *** denote
statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively. T-statistics
are included in parentheses.














Reciprocity 0.0210 0.0329 0.0436 0.0385 0.0219
(0.73) (1.15) (1.59) (1.45) (0.78)
0.0525** 0.0317 0.0121 0.0835*** 0.0722**
Constant (2.07) (1.23) (0.47) (3.33) 2.36
R-squared 0.295 0.290 0.287 0.318 0.297
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